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HARLAN FISKE STONE
The Yale Law Journal records its sorrow at the death of Harlan
Fiske Stone, Chief Justice of the United States since 1941, and
Associate Justice since 1925. In his death both the Union and the
profession sustain a great loss.
THE VALIDITY OF ABSENTEE MARRIAGE
OF SERVICEMEN
DUP NG the Second World War, servicemen overseas wedded sweethearts
at home I without specific authorization by law. - As a result, the validity of
1. The most common means are proxy or telephone ceremonies, or contracts, signed by
proxy or exchanged by mail. See Reynolds, Whwre There's a Will There's a Wrcdding, N. Y.
Sunday News, Sept. 3, 1944, pp. 23-9; O'Neill, Most Married Man in Aaerica, Yanh,
Oct. 5, 1945, p. 11 condensed in Reader's Digest, Dec. 1945, p. 75; Kan. City Star, Mar. 4,
1946, p. 3, col. 2 (attorney's 50th appearance as proxy in ceremony); N. I. Times, July 29,
1945, § 4, p. 2, col. 7 (24th Tulsa proxy wedding).
Sporadic instances of absentee marriage occurred in World War I. See N. Y. Times,
Oct. 8, 1917, p. 7, coL. 2 (telephone); id., June 1, 1918, p. 11, col. 4, and June 22, 1918, p. 9,
col. 5 (telegraph). The Judge Advocate General of the Army suggested coldiers in the AEF
resort to marriage by mail. N. Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1919, p. 4, col. 3. See KOEGui,, CO!'xo.n
LAw MARIAAGE (1922) 133-137; Note, Marriage by .Mail (1919) 32 NARY. L. REv. 848.
2. The only statute authorizing absentee marriage is Mlinn. Lavws 1945, c. 409 (mar-
riage by proxy allowed for duration of war plus six months). Similar bills have been intro-
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absentee marriage, previously a subject for academic legal speculation I or
immigration litigation,4 has become a matter of practical inquiry.5 Accord-
ingly, it is expected that within the next quarter-century the courts will pass
on the legitimacy of these marriages and their offspring.6
In wartime, if only to legitimatize children fathered by servicemen before
embarkation,7 a mechanism for absentee marriage would appear essential.8
For lack of such an express mechanism, agencies dealing with members of
the armed forces have frequently not done substantial justice to service-
men's dependents.9 Albeit the immediate need for a mechanism for ab-
duced in the legislatures of New Jersey (N. Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1944, p. 34, col. 1) and Mon-
tana (Communication to YALE LAW JouRNAL from J. B. C. Knight, Anaconda attorney,
Mar. 4, 1946).
3. See Lorenzen, Marriage by Proxy and Conflict of Laws (1919) 32 HARV. L. REv.
473; (1931) 16 IowA L. REv. 534.
4. See cases cited infra notes 100 and 102.
5. See LoLordo, Proxy and Common Law Marriages (1943) 1 N.A.L.A.O. BRIrn
CASE No. 11, p. 1; Howery, Marriage by Proxy and Other Informal Marriages (1945) 13 U.
KAN. CITY L. REv. 48. And see COMMIrEE ON WAR WoR. AMER. BAR Ass'N, LAWS ON
DomESTc RELATIONS IN TEE 48 STATES (1944).
6. The only known recorded case involving absentee marriage in an American juris-
diction is Great Northern Ry. v. Johnson, 254 Fed. 683 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918) (1919) 32
HAR . L. REV. 848 (marriage by mail sustained). Ex pare Suzanna, 295 Fed. 713 (D. Mass.
1924) suggests marriage by proxy was valid at that time in Pennsylvania, but reliance on
Pennsylvania law is erroneous, the marriage having been celebrated in Portugal. See note
58 infra.
7. The policy of the National Ass'n or" Legal Aid Organizations is that assistance in
procuring absentee marriage be given "only . . . where there is a definite social need, i.e.,
pregnancy." LoLordo, supra note 5, at 2. The Minnesota statute, cited supra note 2, re-
quires a certificate of pregnancy, although a certificate of illegitimate birth has been substi-
tuted. Communication to YALE LAw JouRNAL from Richard H. Bachelder, Minneapolis
attorney, Feb. 15, 1946. Absentee marriage has been resorted to where a planned marriage
was prevented by change in military orders. Reynolds, supra note 1, at p. 28, -col. 2, and
p. 29, col. 2. While in Tunisia, the late Ernie Pyle remarried his wife by proxy after they
decided their 8-months-old divorce was a mistake. Id., at p. 29, col. 4. Since cessation of
hostilities, absentee marriage has been used to enable foreign brides to secure transportation
to the United States [N. Y. Herald Trib., May 11, 1946, p. 3, col. 2 (arrival English proxy
bride on Queen Mary) ] and American brides to join servicemen overseas (Communication
to YALE LAW JOURNAL from J. Ward Arney, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho attorney, Mar. 25, 1946).
Schuschnigg was married by proxy while in German custody. N. Y. Times, June 4, 1938,
p. 17, col. 7, and July 1, 1938, p. 13, col. 1.
8. France, Belgium and Italy authorized marriage by proxy for servicemen in World
War I. See Lorenzen, supra note 3, at 479. Italy revived the practice during the Ethiopian
war (N. Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1935, p. 10, col. 6) and introduced radio marriage in World War II
(id., Jan. 28, 1942, p. 8, col. 7). France renewed the authorization (id., Sept. 14, 1939, p. 15,
col. 2) and permitted such marriage even after death of the groom (id., Mar. 8, 1940, p. 4,
col. 7). Hungary authorized the fiancfes of soldiers killed in action to assume the status of
widows. Id., Mar. 28, 1943, § 1, p. 12, col. 3. Legislation authorizing marriage by proxy was
advocated in England. Id., Apr. 4, 1943, § 1, p. 12, col. 5.
9. The policy of the Comptroller General has been to refuse payment of dependency
allowance to wives created by absentee marriage unless express authorization for such mar-
riage appears in statute or judicial decision. See decisions cited infra note 113.
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sentee marriage has passed, judicial validation of those already used seems
desirable to clarify the status of persons married in absentia and to facilitate
the administration of social measures. Although absentee marriage is vith-
out express American precedent, 10 this discussion vill seek to postulate legal
rationalia for validating such marriage by harmonizing the abseiitee with
more familiar forms of marriage.
ABSENTEE MARRIAGE AS A STATUTORY SOLEMNIZATION
The purpose of American marriage law is to promote familial stability
and secure the legitimacy of children.11 In implementing this policy, statutes
governing entry into marriage exercise two functions: (1) to establish with
certainty when the marriage relation is assumed,' 2 and (2) to protect the
public against undesirable or il-advised marriages. 3 Certainty inbbitained
by prescribing formal solemnization before an authorized third person 14
and by procuring publicity ' 5 and registration."0 Protection is achieved by
requiring, preliminary to solemnization, a license 7 certifying the requisite
mental capacity, freedom from disease, parental consent (for minors), and
observance of a waiting period; and by prohibiting incestuous, polygamous,
and miscegenatic marriages.' 8 Under these statutes an absentee marriage
may best be upheld when an agent is permitted to substitute for the ab-
sentee.u
10. See note 6 supra.
11. See 1 Bisto,, NEw Co uNnrAn-zs ON MAm ,GE, Divo cE AND SEPAn on
(1891) c. 3; 2 SCHOuLER, MARRIAGE, SEPA.ATION AND DIVoRCE (6th ed. 1921) § 1073.
12. See Cook, Reform in the Celebration of Marriage (1888) 61 AT,. Mo. 620, 6S1;
3 HowARD, HISTORY oF MATlmONLL INsTITUTIONs (1904) 135 et seg.
13. See RicHmoND AND HALL, MARRIAGE AND TEE STATE (1929) pt. 2.
14. "The exchange of matrimonial consents in the presence of an authorized third
person" has been termed the "indispensable" element of marriage statutes. Cook, Marriage
Celebration in the United States (1388) 61 AT. Mo. 520. And see Denison v. Denisson, 35 Md.
361, at 379 (1872).
15. Publicity also serves a protective function. See Rxcmxoo AND HAM, MAIAGM
AND TE STATE (1929) c. S.
16. The Massachusetts Bureau of Vital Statistics suggests eleven reasons for perma-
nent official records of marriage. Id. at 294.
17. License is "the initial step of the state in its control of marriage." 1 VhraER,
AuzaxcAw FAIIU.Y LAws (1931) 46. State supervision of marriage by license devices is
considered exhaustively in RicmmoND AND HALL, MARRAGE AND THE StAE (1929). And
see 1 VERNIER, supra § 17 and cross references.
18. Id. §§ 37-47.
19. The Minnesota statute, cited supra notes 2 and 7, contains the only explicit au-
thorization for marriage by an agent, although Delav.-are permits a proxy to procure a licene
for a person critically ill. Rnv. DELA. CODE (1935) § 3490. Iowa expressly validates mar-
riage solemnized in a manner other than that prescribed, but the $50 fine impozed on each
person aiding and abetting such marriage deters experimentation. IOWA CODE (1939)
§ 10437.
A possible alternative is suggested by New York Domestic Relations Law, S1c. 11,
Subd. 4, authorizing marriage by vritten contract. The attorney general of the state rules
19461
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The wording of many statutes, however, has been interpreted as contem-
plating, if not flatly requiring, the personal presence of both parties at license
bureau or solemnization.20 Such narrow interpretation seems unnecessary 21
to satisfy the functional requirements of the marriage statutes, since cer-
tainty and protection could'be adequately achieved where the license is
issued and the ceremony performed upon appropriately acknowledged in-
struments, 22 accompanied, if need be, by affidavits from persons having
knowledge of the absentee.23 Assuming that, by means of these safeguards,
the possibility of fraud, 24 mistake or duress could be equated between ordi-
the parties must sign in the presence of one another. REP. ATr'y GEN. (1934) 371. See also
id. (1933) 448 (license required for contract marriage); and id. (1940) 137 (no authority for
proxy marriage).
20. See REP. ATT'Y GEN. OF N. DAX. (1940-42) 83; ILL. Oss. ATT'y GEN. (1943) 119;
REP. Arr'Y GEN. OF MIcE. (1943-44) 406; REP. ATr'Y GEN. OF Miss. (1941-43) 71. And
see tabulation by states, LoLordo, supra note 5, at 6-16. In most instances it is immaterial
whether the requirement relates to license or solemnization, although a serviceman might
conceivably apply in person for a license and be sent overseas before solemnization. Some
statutes pose an obstacle by requiring that the blood test be certified by a physician licensed
to practice in the state (see 22 ALA. CODE (1940) § 95), or be returned within a period too
short for most overseas servicemen [see Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. (Cum. Supp. 1945) § 3364-A
(15 days allowed)].
21. It is unlikely that many legislatures considered absentee marriage in drafting stat-
utes. But see LA. CiV. CODE (Dart, 1945) § 109 (marriage by procuration prohibited).
Where "no scrutiny of [statutory] text can ever evoke additional consequences , . .we
must attach them, if at all, because some public policy, adequately revealed, would other-
wise be thwarted." Cardozo, J., in People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 23, 150 N. E. 585, 588
(1926). And see 1 BisnoP, op. cit. supra note 11, § 163.
22. The necessity for an unambiguously acknowledged power of attorney for the proxy
should be obvious. In Hardy v. McCrae, C. C. Jackson County, Mo., Docket No. 101474,
Dec. 21, 1945, an annulment was granted on an unopposed petition alleging defendant,
"pretending to act for . . .plaintiff, . . . went through a pretended marriage ceremony"
by proxy while the plaintiff was serving in North Africa. However, marriage by proxy is
generally believed invalid in Missouri. Communication to YALE LAW JOURNAL from S.
Ralph Stone, Independence attorney, Mar. 19, 1946; LoLordo, supra note 5, at 11. Cf.
Howery, supra note 5, at 81. But see COMMITTEE ON WAR WORE, AMiER. BAR Ass'N, LAws
ON DoMsEsTc RELATIONS (1944) 67.
23. Colorado penalizes the issuer of a license to a party lacking capacity unless the
issuer has taken third-party affidavits. CoLo. STAT. ANN. (1935) c. 107, § 7. Oklahoma
permits license to issue on affidavit of a responsible person with knowledge of the parties.
43 OKLA. STAT. ANN. (1937), § 5. In New Mexico a person residing more than ten miles from
a county seat may procure license by affidavit without personal appearance. N. M. STAT.
ANN. (1941) § 65-111. And see 1 VERNIER, AmERICAN FAMILY LAWS (1931) § 31.
24. LoLordo, supra note 5, at 2, warns legal advisers arranging absentee marriages to
inquire "as to any representations that have been made to the soldier as this may ...be
grounds for annuling the marriage." A clear distinction should be made between fraud in
procuring the absentee's proxy and fraudulent representation that a proxy has been pro-
cured. See Hardy v. McCrae, C. C. Jackson County, Mo., Docket No. 101474, Dec. 21,
1945, cited supra note 22. Marriage by proxy should not be confused with fraudulent im-
personation, as was done in N. Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1935, p. 48, col. 3. And see Goldman v.
Dithrich, 131 Fla. 408, 179 So. 715 (1938); Ellis v. Ellis, 152 Miss. 836, 119 So. 304 (1928).
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nary and absentee marriage,25 the absentee marriage so instigated could
usually be annulled with less complication than a conventional marriage
followed by cohabitation. And even the danger of prior revocrqtion could be
disposed of by voiding marriage solemnized in ignorance of revocation, or of
the insanity or death of the absentee.-*3 Dictum to the effect that marriage
is too personal an act for performance by an agent -7 seems to fail to differ-
entiate between the marital relation and the negotiations leading to mar-
riage, which may not lend themselves to performance by a representative,
-0
and the ceremony by which marriage is contracted.
Consequently, there appears no cogent reason why the performance by an
agent of the purely mechanical functions of a party to the marriage cere-
mony should be held to contravene statutory requirement.
Another doctrinal basis for upholding absentee marriage exists in states
which exempt, from the usual requirements for statutory solemnization,
marriage performed according to the customs and usages of a religious de-
nomination or society.2 Such provision vas apparently designed to avoid
statutory conflict with the Quaker wedding ceremony, and many statutes
extend this exemption only to Quakers. In some states, however, the statu-
tory wording is so broad as to offer ground for validating absentee marriage
if provided for by a particular sect. Thus, in Nebraska, the statutory pro-
vision 11
"It shall be lawful for every religious society to join in marriage
such persons as are members of the society, according to the rites
and customs of the society. .. ."
led to a ruling that absentee marriage is valid in that state only if "performed
according to the rites and customs of a religious society of which both con-
tracting parties are members." "
The only known religious denomination specifically authorizing absentee
25. But see Lorenzen, supra note 3, at 477.
26. As provided in Canon 1091, Code of Canon Law of the Roman Catholic Church.
The Roman Catholic authorization of marriage by proxy is discussed infra p. 740 and
note 32.
27. See 1 MECHEm, AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) § 126. Cf. letter opinion, Attorney General
of South Dakota to Vincent LoLordo, July 29, 1943, copy to Y, B LAw JoUur;,%L, Mar. 6,
1946, p. 5: "the essentially personal relationship to be created . ..not being a mere prop-
erty right, is not one that may be consummated by a representative."
28. As in the case of Miles Standish, principal, and John Alden, agent. ".S. iSI peal:
for yourself, John." LONGFELLOW, Tnm CouRmsP oF MNEs STmmxisa (1855) pt. 3. In
other cultures, the role of an agent in this connection is less circumscribed. Matchmakers
betroth and wed unacquainted couples in Persia. 1 WOOD, THE _VEDDING AY IN ALL AGES
Am CoUmrNIEs (1869) 90. The jus primae n4odis has had vide application. 1 WVEsmn-
m.ARcK, HISTORY OF HumsAx MARmAGE (1921) c. 5.
29. See 1 VERNMR, AzrmRicAN FAimy LAWS (1931) § 24.
30. NEB. REV. STAT. (1943) 42-115.
31. County Judge Charles J. Southard, Omaha, quoted in Gregory, War Nokes (1943)
29 A. B.A. J. 83.
1946]
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marriage is the Roman Catholic Church which, in Canons 1089 and 1091 of
-the Code of Canon Law, 32 provides for the solemnization of marriage where a
proxy has been authorized by the absentee. Accordingly, an Iowa couple
-was married by proxy by an Omaha Catholic priest.33
To validate absentee marriage, another rationale employing these Canons
has been developed in New Mexico, where the basic marriage law is Spanish
rather than common law.34 It is maintained that the Spanish law reenacted
-Catholic proxy marriage, and that the marriage statute extended the privi-
lege of solemnizing marriage, including marriage by proxy, to ministers of all
-denominations and to civil magistrates."
ABSENTEE MARRIAGE AS A FORi OF COMMON LAW MARRIAGE
In the seventeen jurisdictions recognizing common law marriage," ab-
-sentee marriage appears to satisfy the basic requirement of present mutual
32. Quoted, translated and annoted in AYRINHAC, MARRIAGE LEGISLATION IN TULE Nzw
CODE OF CANON LAW (Rev. Ed. 1932) §§ 1089, 1091. The provision dates from the time of
Pope Boniface VIII. See Lorenzen, supra note 3, at 475.
33. N. Y. Sunday News, Sept. 3, 1944, p. 29, col. 2.
34. See opinion of the Attorney General of New Mexico, Rep. ATT'y GEN. oF N. M.
•(1943-44) 74, citing In re Gabaldon, 38 N. M. 392, 34 P. (2d) 672 (1934). The Attorney
-General's opinion does not refer to the religious usage exemption, extended to "any religious
-society." N. M. STAT. ANN. (1941) § 65-103.
35. The argument is potentially applicable in any states formerly Spanish or Mexican.
However, holdings as to the basic law in these states are in confusion. In re Gabaldon,
38 N. M. 392, 34 P.(2d) 672 (1934) held that the Canons of the Council of Trent abrogating
Catholic recognition of consensual, but not proxy, marriage in 1563 (see Lorenzen, supra
.note 3, at 476) had been extended to the Spanish colonies in this continent. Hallett v. Col.
lins, 10 How. 174 (1850) held contra in construing Louisiana law. The IalleU decision has,
however, been challenged as historically erroneous. Memorandum by Thayer, quoted at
length by Sadler, J., dissenting in the Gabaldon case, supra, at 412, 34 P.(2d) at 685. The
California view is similar to that of the Hallett decision, supra. See 16 Cal. Jur. 914 and
,cases cited. Texas and Arizona courts appear to have held that the common law of marriage
superseded the Mexican law. See Grigsby v. Reib, 105 Tex. 597, 600, 153 S. W. 1124, 1125
(1913); United States v. Tenney, 2 Ariz. 127, 133, 11 Pac. 472, 474 (1886).
An analogous line of argument in common law states would be that marriage by proxy
existed at English common law (Lorenzen, supra note 3, at 480) and, in the absence of ex-
press prohibition, remains valid so long as other provisions of the statute are complied with.
However, the English historical argument lacks the concrete continuity evidenced by
Canon 1089, and, if the colonists imported the practice into this country, it has escaped
record.
36. LoLordo, supra note 5, lists eighteen common law marriage jurisdictions: Alabama,
Colorado, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michi-
gan, Mississippi, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota,
and Texas. The Pennsylvania courts have since virtually abolished common law marriage
by refusing to recognize it in the absence of license. Fisher v. Sweet & McClain, 154 Pa.
Super. 216, 35 A.(2d) 756 (1944). In 1915, 28 jurisdictions were believed to recognize com-
mon law marriage. Note, L. R. A. 1915E 8, 17. Various tabulations are collected, 1 VERNIER,
AmERICAN FAmrx LAWS (1931) 106.
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consent 7 to be husband and wife immediately.3 In seven of these states,
it is maintained that some form of absentee marriage is valid, but in the
remaining jurisdictions the common law marriage doctrine has been so con-
fused in application that validation of absentee marriage is considered un-
likely. 9 This confusion stems from an indiscriminate application of the doc-
trine to two essentially different fact situations: (1) where a couple live to-
gether following a consensual marriage (i.e., without ceremony other than an
agreement to be husband and wife) ;" and (2) where a ceremonial marriage is
defective either for non-compliance with statutory formality 41 or because one
party was under a disability, since removed. 42 The language of the courts
makes no express distinction between these situations, although an inarticu-
late distinction is indicated by the tendency to approve the common law
marriage doctrine more readily where the case of first impression arises on a
defective ceremonial marriage.4 3
Since the consensual and defective ceremonial marriages involve anti-
thetical policies, validation of absentee marriage will in part depend upon
the situation with which the absentee marriage is associated. Inasmuch as
the consensual marriage thwarts the efforts of statute to achieve certainty
and protection, contributes to immorality, invites fraud, and hampers
37. See MADDEN, PERSONS AND Dosmst=c RmA-no s (1931) § 22; 2 Schouler, op. cit.
supra note 11, c. 12. The classic formulation required either an agreement per rcrba de
praesenti or per verba defuturo cur copula. See 1 HowA=, HISORY oF ,%T A IOIAL. IN-
S-TITUTioNS (1904) 336-340; 2 Kent Comm. (14th ed. 1896) *87. The funuro marriage has
never been recognized in this country. MADDEN, supra, at 58. The distinction in tenses
makes more sense in the Latin in which it was formulated. See Martin Luther's acrid com-
mentary, quoted 1 HowAan, supra, at 341.
38. If the parties contemplate some future act, such as a ceremony, before they are
"really married," the agreement does not constitute marriage. See Van Tuyl v. Van Tuyl,
57 Barb. Sup. 235, 238 (N. Y. 1869); 1 BisHop, op. cit. supra note 11, § 364.
39. The states in which validity of absentee marriage appears probableare Idaho, Mon-_
tana, South Dakota, Kansas, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania and FloridL Se discussin irnfra
pp. 744-8. Compare LoLordo and Howery, both supra note 5. The probable invalidity
of absentee marriage in Georgia is less certain than either of the above writers presumes. A
serviceman's absentee marriage contract was admitted to record, Bk. 1469, p. 83, Clerk
Sup. Ct., Fulton County, Ga. Communication to Y.n LAw JouAtaL from Attorney Gen-
eral of Georgia, Apr. 10, 1946.
40. See, e.g., Dyer v. Brannock, 66 Mo. 391 (1877); in re Love's Estate, 42 Olda. 478,
142 Pac. 305 (1914).
41. See cases cited infra note 46.
42. Such was the fact situation in Fenton v. Reed, 4 Johns. Rep. 52 (N. Y. 1809) which
became the leading precedent for common law marriage. See also, e.g., Teter v. Teter,
101 Ind. 129 (1885); Conn v. Conn, 2 Kan. App. 419,42 Pac. 1006 (1895).
43. The leading cases are collected in KOEGEL, CotoN LAW MAPRIAGE (1922) C. 6,7
and MADDEN, PERSONS AND DomESTIc RELAT ONS (1931) 51, n. 37, and 53, n. 38. Addi-
tional cases are In re Gabaldon, 38 N. M. 392, 34 P.(2d) 672 (1934); State ex rel. Felaon v.
Allen, 129 Conn. 427, 29 A.(2d) 306 (1942); Roberts v. Roberts, 58 Wyo. 438, 133 P.(2d)
492 (1943). A brief analysis indicates 14 of 32 initial cases favoring the common law mar-
riage doctrine arose on consensual marriages, while such marriage gave rise to 10 of 17 initial
cases rejecting the doctrine.
19461
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
the work of administrative and social agencies, 44 association of the social
stigma 45 of the consensual marriage with absentee marriage may lead to
rejection of the latter as opposed to public policy. On the other hand, use of
the common law marriage doctrine to sustain a defective ceremonial mar-
riage implements the policy to promote marital stability and to avoid ille-
gitimacy by preserving a flexibility of circumstances in which the courts can
sustain a worthwhile marriage. 4 In this context, policy considerations
predicate sustaining absentee marriage. And the absentee marriage appears
to fall factually within the category of defective ceremonial marriage, since
the parties predicate marriage on a ritual which expresses a clear intent to
marry, and is suitable for public record.
Even in jurisdictions not now recognizing common law marriage, courts
might be willing to uphold the absentee as a defective ceremonial marriage,
if steered away from the old syntax of common law marriage, based on con-
sensual marriage cases.
47
An additional impediment to absentee as a form of common law marriage
44. See RIcHMOND AND HALL, MARRIAGE AND THE STATE (1929) at 29-30; 3 HowARD,
op. cit. supra note 37, at 101-4. And see Roberts v. Roberts, 58 Wyo. 438,465-7, 133 P.(2d)
492, 501-3 (1943) and cases cited.
45. "According to popular view, common law marriage simply means living in adul-
tery." KOEGEL, COMMON LAW MARRIAGE (1922) 4 Family 172. "The term 'common law
wife' . . . is a synonym for a woman who, having lived in a state of concubinage with a
man . . . seeks (to share) in the proceeds of his property." In re Brush, 25 App. Div. 610,
613, 49 N. Y. Supp. 803, 806 (1898). "So-called common law marriage contravenes public
policy and should not be accorded any favor." In re Redman, 135 Ohio St. 554, 558, 21
N. E. (2d) 659, 661 (1939). The states "should abolish common law marriage. The great
weight of modem opinion sustains this contention." 1 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAImLy LAWS
(1931) 108.
46. The functional utility of the common law marriage doctrine was greatest in the
nineteenth century. The legal approach of the day invalidated marriage not conforming to
every detail of the statute if the statute were construed as mandatory (i.e., prescribing the
only form for contracting marriage). On this theory, marriages were attacked on trivial
grounds. See, e.g., Londonderry v. Chester, 2 N. H. 268 (1820) (minister not settled
over a regular parish); Pearson v. Howey, 11 N. J. L. Rep. 12 (1829) (justice of the peace
crossed county line); Campbell's Admr. v. Gullatt, 43 Ala. 57 (1869) (license issued by clerk
without authority); Hutchins v. Kimmell, 31 Mich. 126 (1875) (marriage certificate did not
specify compliance with statute). By construing the statute as directory (i.e., not excluding
other forms of marriage), courts were able to sustain as valid at common law marriage de-
fective in compliance with statute. Today, marriages entered into in good faith but defec-
tive in purely formal respects are protected by statute [see 1 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY
LAws (1931) § 25] or judicial amelioration of the mandatory doctrine [see 2 SCIOULER, op.
cit. supra note 11, at §§ 1201, 1217; MADDEN, op. cit. supra note 37, at § 23], and the children
of marriages null in law are generally legitimated by statute [see 1 VERNIER, supra at § 48;
Note (1933) 84 A. L. R. 4991.
47. In re Gabaldon, 38 N. M. 392, 396, 34 P.(2d) 672, 675 (1934) criticizes common law
marriage because of ". . . the ease with which a mere adulterous union may become, in the
mouths of interested and unscrupulous witnesses, a common law marriage." To the same
effect, see Fisher v. Sweet & McClain, 154 Pa. Super. 216, 226, 35 A.(2d) 756, 761 (1944)
quoted infra note 89. The objection, while applicable to a consensual marriage, seems
groundless in the case of a defective ceremonial or an absentee marriage.
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is the requirement, in some jurisdictions, of cohabitation to prove mutual
consent.4 While doubtless of evidentiary value in establishing an intent to
assume the duties and obligations of matrimony in a consensual marriage, °
this requirement appears unnecessary in a defective ceremonial marriage,
where other external evidence of agreement to marry is av.ailable.9 As ap-
plied to service-separated couples married in absentia, the requirement is es-
pecially unreasonable in view of the clear and publicly expressed intent to
assume the marital status immediately, on the same basis as conventionally-
married couples separated by war.
A less common obstacle to absentee marriage is the occasional statement
that the consents requisite to common law marriage must be repeated by the
parties in the presence of one another.51 The dictum, while traceable to
Lord Cranworth in Campbell v. Campbell,5 2 is sometimes grounded in uncon-
ventional translation of the phrase per verba de praesenW,-3 or in misquota-
tion of American decisions 14 and thus appears inaccurate or inadequate.
A logical approach to absentee marriage is exemplified in the only reported
case involving absentee marriage within American jurisdictions, Great Norlth-
ern Railway v. Johnson,5 5 which rejected the requirements of both presence
4S. According to LoLordo, supra note 5, cohabitation is clearly not required in onl.
five common law marriage states (Georgia, Kansas, Ohio, Oklahoma and Pennsylvania).
49. Because consensual marriage cases most often arise after the death of one or both
parties, direct evidence of the agreement may be laclng, or testimony to an unvitnezzed
agreement may be given by an interested party. Consequently, evidence of cohabitation,
holding out as husband and wife, and general repute among the neighbors is frequently par-
tinent to establish the existence and nature of the agreement. For a concise evaluation of
evidence in consensual marriage cases, see In re Estate of Lust, 186 Minn. 405, 40S-9,
sub. nor. Ghelin v. Johnson, 243 N. IV. 443, 444-6 (1932). But many cases confuse what is
necessary to create and what may be used to prove a marriage. See KOEGEL, Co o. LAw
AzRTRAGE (1922) 131, 151.
50. But see the argument in Grigsby v. Reib, 105 Tex. 597, 153 S. XV. 1124 (1913)
that the cohabitation requirement is more logical in that the rights of the parties arse out
of the status of husband and wife, which begins on assumption, not on contract. (The fact
that the parties apparently consorted only in a brothel may have influenced the court's
reasoning). Cf. Herd v. Herd, 194 Ala. 613, 69 So. 835 (1915) where deceaced went through
a ceremonial marriage with a woman already pregnant, in the presence of her father. The
marriage was declared invalid under the statute because the license was improperly irued,
and at common law because there was no subsequent cohabitation.
A serviceman's absentee marriage might be brought within the rule of the Grigsby case if
assumption of the marital status can be satisfied without physical cohabitation, but appears
to be invalid under the Herd decision.
51. See REP'. AT'VY GEN. OF FLA. (1943-44) 4S9 and note 93 infra.
52. L. R. 1 H. L. Sc. App. Cas. 182, at 199 (1367).
53. See letter opinion of Attorney General of Indiana to Edward E. Odom, colicitor,
Veteran's Administration, July 3, 1944, copy to Y.%E LAw JourNAL, Mar. 6, 1946: "If the
contract be made through the words of those present, it amounts to a valid marriage."
54. As in 18 R. C. L. 391,392, citing Peck v. Peck-, 12 R. 1. 435 (1,0). The only appli-
cable passage in the cited case occurs at 488, and refers to the parties consenting "to be
husband and wife presently" (i.e., immediately, forthwith).
55. 254 Fed. 683 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918), (1919) 32 HARv. L. Rnv. 84. Other reported
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and cohabitation, and held squarely that a valid marriage can be contracted
by mail. The parties exchanged a written contract of marriage while located
in Minnesota and Missouri, both jurisdictions recognizing common law mar-
riage without requirement of cohabitation." The court, applying contract
principles, 57 ruled that an offer had been transmitted from Minnesota and
accepted in Missouri. The contract being thus executed in Missouri, the
validity of the marriage was determinable by the laws of that state. The
court found nothing in the Missouri law beyond the requirement of present
mutual consent, and held the marriage valid; adding, the same result would
be reached by applying Minnesota law.s This decision, in theory, would
appear to sustain any of the-forms of absentee marriage, so long as the
written contract were accepted, or the ceremony performed, in a jurisdiction
recognizing common law marriage as complete upon exchange of consents.
However, as a practical matter, rationalia in support of absentee marriage
as a form of common law marriage must be adapted in each jurisdiction to
peculiarities of local doctrine, as illustrated by the devices adopted in the
seven common law marriage states apparently most apt to validate ab-
sentee marriage "9 -Idaho, Montana, South Dakota, Kansas, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania and Florida.
In Idaho, Montana and South Dakota, absentee marriage is possibly valid
under statutory provision for creation of marriage by mutual assumption of
the marital status, 0 which may be evidenced, in the latter two states, by a
formal written declaration of marriage.6'
The Idaho statute provides that
"Consent alone will not constitute marriage; it must be followed
by a solemnization or by mutual assumption of marital rights,
duties or obligations.
cases adjudicate marriages by proxy celebrated in a foreign country. See the immigration
cases, infra notes 100 and 102; Hardin v. Davis, 30 Ohio 0. 524 (C. P. Hamilton County
1945) (Mexican proxy marriage).
56. Both states have since abolished common law marriage Mo. REv. STAT. ANN.
(1939) § 3364; MINN. STAT. (1941) § 517.01.
57. The contractual concept of marriage permeates American law [see 1 VERNIER,
AMERICAN FAMLY LAW (1931) § 14], but is seldom so literally applied. Cf. Carmichael v.
State, 12 Ohio St. 553, at 559 (1861) (distinction drawn between "executory" and "executed"
marriage contract).
58. This portion of the decision caused the court in Ex parle Suzanna, 295 Fed, 713
(D. Mass. 1924) to rely on Pennsylvania law to validate marriage of a resident of that state
celebrated by proxy in Portugal, in violation of the principle that the law of the place of
celebration controls. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) §§ 121, 124. See criticism
of the Suzanne decision on these grounds, Note (1924) 33 YAE L. J. 777. For similar con-
fusion, see In re Lum Lin Ying, 59 Fed. 682 (D. Ore. 1894).
59. See supra note 39.
60. The statutes are IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) § 31-201; MoNT. REv. CoDE (1935)
§ 5695; S. D. CODE (1939) § 14.0101. A similar provision in the California code was deleted
in 1895. See 16 Cal. Jur., Marriage § 11; CAL. Civ. CODE (Deering 1941) § 55.
61. MONT. REV. CODE (1935) §§ 5724-26. S. D. CODE (1939) §§ 14.0120, 14.0121.
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On the basis of the Idaho statute, the validity of marriage by proxy has been
" ipredicated upon (a) statutory medical examinations, (b) license
and (c) ceremony; all bottomed upon executed and acknowledged
power of attorney from the absentee party and written contract con-
templating the marriage by proxy." 62
Marriages by proxy entered into in Idaho in accordance with this opinion
have been accepted by the military services for the purpose of family allow-
ance.
63
The Montana and South Dakota statutes are substantially identical with
that of Idaho, the Montana statute substituting the phrase "mutual and
public assumption of the marital relation." In Montana, judicial decisions
indicate that an "open and notorious" living together is necessary to consti-
tute mutual assumption, in the absence of a written declaration"C In South
Dakota, marriage by proxy has been regarded as unfeasible because of the
license and physical examination requirements,65 but it has been suggested
that the requirement of mutual assumption may be satisfied where the
parties to a serviceman's absentee marriage, contracted by writing or other
means of communication, conduct themselves "in such manner as will give
rise to full and undivided repute that they are husband and wife." 11
The statutory declaration of marriage in South Dakota and Montana is
an instrument filed in lieu of a marriage certificate, but has been used during
the war as a vehicle for the creation of absentee marriage. It is not clear
whether such a declaration would, in and of itself, be accepted as creating a
valid marriage.s Construing the statutes as a whole, it is maintainable that
the declaration is no more than evidence, suitable for public record, of a pre-
A similar section in the California code was deleted in 1S95. 16 Cal. Jur. 916; CL. CIV.
CODE (Deering 1941) § 75, although where record of a marriage has been lost, a declaration
by the parties is admissible to record. Id. at §§ 76-7.
62. Opinion of J. Ward Arney, Committee on War Work, Idaho State Bar, to Com-
mittee on War Work, Amer. Bar Ass'n, Feb. 25, 1944, copy to YALE LAw Jour3JAL, Mar. 6,
1946.
63. Communication to YALE LA wJomax.TA. from J. Ward Arney, Mar. 6,1946.
64. Communication to YALE L.Aw JouxA. from Attorney General of Montana,
Mar. 7, 1946.
65. Letter opinion to Vincent LoLordo from Attorney General of South Dakota,
July 29, 1943, copy to YALE LAw JouRNAL, Mar. 6, 1946, p. 5.
66. Id. at 3, citing Svendsen v. Svendsen, 37 S. D. 353, 158 N. 11. 410 (1916).
67. Communication to YALE Lw JourNAm from Attorney General of Montana,
Mar. 7, 1946. A Montana declaration was held not to establish lawful wife for purpoMe3 of
officer's dependency allowance by the Comptroller General Decision B-466S9, Feb. 13,
1945. However, the decision applied the law of the serviceman's residence, Kentucky, on
reasoning analogous to that by which the Missouri law controlled in the Grcat Norlterr. ca-se.
68. See Attorney General of South Dakota, supra note 65, at 4: "When such declara-
tion has been made at the time of, or after the fact of, a common law marriage, it is an
authentication thereof, and, as between the parties, I think conclusive. Neverthelecs as
affecting third parties the essential a priori facts of a contract 'per verba in praeseni' and
assumption of marital rights etc., would have to be independently established...."
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existing or simultaneous marriage created by consent and mutual and public
assumption.69
Kansas requires no physical examination prior to marriage, issues a license
on application of "any person legally entitled to" one, and the statute con-
tains no requirement of presence.70 Furthermore, the Kansas courts have
shown no disposition to espouse a flat requirement of cohabitation, but "the
decisions take it for granted that some measure of publicity is a distinguish-
ing feature if not an essential attribute of a common law marriage." 71 The
critical factor, "measure of publicity," serves as a check on fraudulent claims
of secret marriage advanced long after the date,72 and would appear to pre-
sent no obstacle to the validity of marriage by proxy or by written contract
publicly proclaimed. The Attorney General of the State, in a formal opin-
ion,73 has postulated the validity of marriage by proxy both on the theory
that such was recognized at English common law,74 and the reasoning of the
Great Northern case.
Oklahoma issues a license on the sworn application of a person having
knowledge of the facts, has no apparent requirement of presence in the mar-
riage statute,75 and, prior to 1945, required no health certificate. G The Okla-
homa courts have held that marriage arises on the contract, without the
necessity of the parties holding themselves out as husband and wife or pro-
fessedly living together in that relation.77 Marriages by proxy have been
Marriage by declaration was rejected in the only recorded Montana case, State v. Newman,
66 Mont. 180, 213 Pac. 805 (1923), when advanced as defense to rape. The court apparently
considered the declaration as an attempt to create a marriage at the date of the offense,
when the parties did not deem themselves married. The reasoning of the dissent "had a
better grasp of the whole case . . . and would be adopted by our Supreme Court at the
present time." Attorney General of Montana, supra note 67. Cf. Toon v. Huberty, 104 Cal,
260, 37 Pac. 944 (1894), where a similar declaration was held invalid because the parties had
previously agreed never to assume the marital status or cohabit.
69. See notes 64 and 65 supra. A sample "Declaration and Contract of Marriage"
furnished by the Attorney General of Montana contains the phrase ". . . we mutually
declare that we are married and are husband and wife and have been since (date), on which
day we contracted and agreed between ourselves to be and were married." Similarly, a
specimen "Contract for Ceremonial Marriage" prepared by J. Ward Arney (supra note 62)
for Idaho proxy marriages reads, "having heretofore entered into an oral contract of mar-
riage and consummated such marriage, resulting in the . . . birth of . . . a child."
70. The Kansas marriage statute is c. 23, art. 1, KAN. GEN. STAT. (1935).
71. Butler v. Butler, 130 Kan. 186, 190, 285 Pac. 627, 629 (1930).
72. In the Butler case, 130 Kan. 186, 285 Pac. 627 (1930), the parties to an alleged
secret common law marriage entered into seventeen years before sought to set aside a mort-
gage foreclosure title on the grounds the "wife" had not signed the mortgage.
73. Cited by LoLordo, supra note 5, at 9-10.
74. See note 35 supra.
75. The Oklahoma marriage statute is 43 OKLA. STAT. ANN. (1941).
76. See 43 OKLA. STAT. ANN. (Cum. Supp. 1945) § 31 et seq. Under certain condltions,
the Judge of a County Court may dispense with the requirement. Id. § 32.
77. See Mudd v. Perry, 108 Okla. 168, 173, 235 Pac. 479, 483 (1925); Tiuna v, Will.
mott, 162 Okla. 42, 43, 19 P.(2d) 145, 146 (1933), and cases cited. The Oklahoma courts,
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performed, 7  but without official encouragement." Written contracts of
marriage have been signed before a magistrate and witnesses by proxies for
both parties0 However, the Comptroller General has refused to authorize
the payment of dependency allowance to wives created by absentee marriage
in either Kansas 81 or Oklahoma,8 2 for lack of specific authorization by stat-
ute or judicial decision.
The Pennsylvania requirement that both parties must appear to secure a
license is deemed to obviate marriage by prox 3", Prior to 1944, it was
believed that absentee marriage could be contracted by mail,84 on the au-
thority of Ex parte Suzanna0 5 and by the use of cohabitation as an alterna-
tive method of proof of intent to marry in the Pennsylvania decisions. 2 A
Pennsylvania mail marriage was approved by the Comptroller General for
purposes of dependency allowance. 7 In 1944, the Pennsylvania Superior
Court, in a judicial rider attached to the decision in Fisher v. Sweet & Mc-
Clain,93 served notice that the court would not recognize common law mar-
riage entered into after the date of the decision unless preceded by license.
however, stress legitimacy of children as the policy behind recognition of common law mar-
riage. Ibid.; In re Love's Estate, 42 Okla. 478, 485, 142 Pac. 305, 308 (1914).
78. See Howery, supra note 5, at 92.
79. The policy of the Attorney General of Oklahoma is not to encourage marriage other
than in conformity with statute. Communication to Y.LE LAw Journ..L, Mar. 6, 1946.
The War Work Committee of the State Bar Ass'n has e-spressed the opinion marriage by
mail is probably valid (Opinion to Lt. Gordon H. Shumard, Jan. 26, 1946, copy to YALn
LAw JoURNAL, Mar. 6, 1946) but declines to go on record as to proxy marriage. Communi-
cation.to YALE LAW JouRNAL from H. T. Tumilty, chairman, Mar. 6, 1946.
80. N. Y. Sunday News, Sept. 3, 1944, p. 29, col. 5. These marriages were not accepted
by any of the service-connected agencies (Office of Dependency Benefits, Comptroller-
General, and Veterans Administration) for payments to servicemen's dependents. Com-
munication to YALE LAw Jouns. from James B. Diggs, Jr., chairman, Legal Aid Com-
mittee, Tulsa Bar Ass'n, Apr. 30, 1946.
81. Decision B-52248, Nov. 26, 1945.
82. Decision B-49442, June 13, 1945.
83. LoLordo, supra note 5, at 14, citing 48 PA. STAT. § 5 (Purdon 1930); And see Com-
munications to Nat'l Ass'n of Legal Aid Organizations, 1 N. A. L. A. 0. BlMF CAsE No. 4,
at 6, 1 id., No. 6, at 6-7.
84. See communications cited supra note 83. The Philadelphia Legal Aid Society pro-
posed an acknowledged agreement to be recorded by the Recorder of Deeds.
85. 295 Fed. 713 (D. Mfass. 1924). See note 58 supra.
86. See In Re MlcGrath's Estate, 319 Pa. 309, 179 Ad. 599 (1935).
87. Decision B-41254, June 24, 1944. The Pennsylvania State Dep't, however, de-
clared the marriage not valid. N. Y. Sunday News, Sept. 3, 1944, p. 28, cal. 3.
88. 154 Pa. Super. 216, 35 A.(2d) 756 (1944); 18 Tmip. L. Q. 264. The portion of the
opinion announcing future non-recognition of common law marriage appears at 224, 35 A.
(2d) at 759, after the case at bar had been determined. See criticism on this point, Pen
Common Law Marriages in Pennsylvania (1945) 49 Dicru. L. REv. 94.
89. The court, at 226, 35 A.(2d) 761, expressed a purpose to "establish a prevent intent
on the part of the applicants to be married, and not merely an intent to have sex.-ual rela-
tions," but placed main reliance on the necessity of such a ruling to implement the Marriage
License Act of 1939 [48 PA. STAT. (Purdon, Cum. Supp. 1945) §§ 20-4, repealed and super-
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As a result, the Comptroller General has refused to recognize Pennsylvania
mail marriages contracted after that date."
In Florida, although the validity of common law marriage in the absence
of cohabitation is considered doubtful, 91 the Attorney General rules 12 that
marriage by telephone is valid, but marriage by proxy is invalid because
presence is necessary at common law.9 3 Satisfaction of a presence require-
ment by telephone marriage appears inconsistent with the reluctance of the
courts to approve oaths and acknowledgments by telephone."4
ABSENTEE MARRIAGE AND CONFLICT OF LAWS
Unless odious to public policy or contrary to positive law, a marriage valid
where celebrated is valid everywhere,9 5 even though the parties resort to the
seded, 35 PA. STAT. (Purdon, Cum. Supp. 1945) § 587.6] requiring a pre-marital blood test,
The legislature, however, expressly refused to abolish common law marriage in 1941 and
1943. See.Notes (1941) 15 TEMP. L. Q. 541, (1944) 18 TEip. L. Q. 264, 267.
90. Decision B-45639, Dec. 19, 1944. The Pennsylvania legal aid societies ceased
assistance in procuring mail marriages after the court's decision. See J. Adv. Gen., Legal
Assistance Memo. No. 18, Aug. 10, 1944, § 2, quoted (1944) 2 N. A. L. A. 0. BRIEF CASE 70.
91. See LoLordo, supra note 5, at 8, citing Chaves v. Chaves, 79 Fla. 602, 84 So. 672
(1920). But the court in that case, at 614, 84 So. at 676, said "it is not essential to require
'cohabitation and repute' . . . though . . . often resorted to as evidence .
92. REP. ATT'Y GEN. (1943-44) 489.
93. Citing Marsicano v. Marsicano, 79 Fla. 278, 84 So. 156 (1920). The~presence re-
quirement is scarcely dictum in that case, being included in a page-long definition of com-
mon law marriage at 284, 84 So. at 158, from 18 R. C. L. 391, 392, which is clearly erroneous
on that point. See note 54 supra.
94. See Hutchinson v. Stone, 79 Fla. 157, 84 So. 151 (1920) (acknowledgement by
telephone held not presence before notary). Accord: Oswald v. Newbanks, 336 111. 490,
168 N. E. 340 (1929); Southern State Bank v. Sumner, 187 N. C. 762, 122 S, E. 848 (1924);
Myers v. Eby, 33 Idaho 266, 193 Pac. 77 (1920); Wester v. Hurt, 123 Tenn. 508, 130 S. W.
842 (1910). Contra: Wooten v. Farmer's and Merchant's Bank, 158 Ark. 179, 249 S. W.
569 (1923); Banning v. Banning, 80 Cal. 271, 22 Pac. 210 (1889). Oaths and affidavits by
telephone are generally invalid. In re Napolis, 169 App. Div. 469, 155 N. Y. Supp. 416
(1915); Carnes v. Carnes, 138 Ga. 1, 74 S. E. 785 (1912); Sullivan v. First Nat'l Bank, 37
Tex. Civ. App. 228, 83 S. W. 421 (1904). Contra: Kuhn v. St. Joseph, 234 S. W. 353 (Mo.
App. 1921). The Attorney General of Missouri has refused to authorize telephone marriage
in that state. N. Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1942, p. 44, col. 4. However, telephone marriages have
been performed in Mississippi (N. Y. Sunday News, Sept. 3, 1944, p. 29, col. 1), Kansas
(id. p. 29, col. 2) and Indiana (N. Y. Times, July 29, 1945, § 1, p. 37, col. 4).
95. See RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) §§ 121-32. And bee Taintor, Effect
of Extra-State Marriage Ceremonies (1938) 10 Miss. L. J. 105. A proxy marriage is deemed
celebrated where the ceremony takes place. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws (1934)
§ 124. The same rule would appear to apply to a proxy-signed contract wedding. The place
of celebration of a mail marriage is ascertained by construing the second party's acknowledg-
ment as acceptance of an offer initiated by the first party, the contract being complete in the
jurisdiction of acceptance, in accordance with the rule in Adams v. Lindsell, 1 Barn. & Aid.
681 (K. B. 1818). See Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 254 Fed. 683 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918).
It might seem that a telephone marriage is celebrated where the minister is located, but this
principle is less attractive where the couple is together and the minister the absentee. See
N. Y. Times, June 11, 1938, p. 17, col. 7.
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place of celebration to evade the provisions of the law in the state of domi-
cil.2u This principle is peculiarly important to absentee marriage, because of
the frequency with which parties domiciled elsewhere have had recourse to a
state where absentee marriage is believed valid.5Y Thus, at least twvo mar-
riages of American servicemen overseas to girls at home, solemnized by
proxy in Mexico, neither party being present, have recently been sustained. 
3
On this same principle, it has been held that the Louisiana prohibition of
marriage by proxy does not invalidate marriage of a Louisiana resident to a
person in a jurisdiction authorizing such marriage, since the prohibition ap-
plies only to marriages solemnized within the state ;3 and the Federal courts
have sustained marriage performed by proxy in a country authorizing such
marriage, where the absentee was a resident of the United States and his
spouse sought admission as a non-quota or illiterate immigrant.1-3
The present scope of the principle has been criticized as hindering effective
implementation of the protective function where the parties seek to evade
such police restrictions as premarital physical examination, waiting period,
and parental consent. 01 This criticism should not, however, apply to ab-
sentee marriage of servicemen, the permissibility of which depends purely on
the forms required to create a marriage.
96. See Van Voorhis v. Brintnall, 86 N. Y. 18 (1881); Loth v. Loth's Estate, 54 Colo.
200, 129 Pac. 827 (1913).
97. See O'Neill, supra note 1. In only one or tso of approximately thirty proxy-signed
contract marriages in Tulsa, Okla., were either of the parties residents of Olahoma. Com-
munication to YALE LAw JouRNAL from James B. Diggs, Jr., chairman, Legal Aid Com-
mittee, Tulsa County Bar Ass'n, Apr. 30, 1946.
98. Hardin v. Davis, 30 Ohio 0. 524, (C. P. Hamilton County, 1945); Commonwealth v.
Edington, Phila. Munic. Ct., Mar. 1, 1945, N. Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1946, p. 15, col. 7. In the
latter case, however, the court declined to pass on the validity of the marriage other than to
negative criminal intent in a fornication proceeding. Accord: Commonwealth v. Munzon
127 Mass. 459 (1879) (invalid marriage Uid defense to prosecution for lewd and lascivious
cohabitation).
Stern, Mfarriages by Proxy in Mexico (1945) 19 So. CALiF. L. PEv. 109, at 116 suggests
that proxy marriage of Americans in Mexico may be subject to annulment there for violation
of the domiciliary requirements.
99. U. S. ex rel. Modianos v. Tuttle, 12 F. (2d) 927 (E. D. La. 1925) (proxy marriage in
Turkey). Cf. Shea v. Shea, 294 N. Y. 909, 63 N. E. (2d) 113 (1945) rca'ing 263 App. Div.
677, 52 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 756 (2d Dep't 1945), 45 COL. L. Rnv. 457, 14 Fo nrAnt L. REv. 98.
The Columbia note erroneously treats the Appellate Division decision as giving extraterri-
torial application to the statute abolishing common law marriage, although a majority on
both courts denied extraterritorial application.
100. The leading case is Ex parle Suzanna, 295 Fed. 713 (D. Mass. 1924), 33 YALE L. J.
777, discussed note 58 supra. See also Kzne v. Johnson, 13 F. (2d) 432 (D. Mass. 1926);
U. S. ex rel. Modianos v. Tuttle, 12 F. (2d) 927 (E. D. La. 1925); U. S. ex rel. Aznar v. Com-
missioner of Immigration, 298 Fed. 103 (S. D. N. Y. 1924). Contra: In re Lum Lin Ying,
59 Fed. 682 (D. Ore. 1894). Since 1924, Federal statute prohibits recognition of proxy or
picture marriages for immigration purposes. 43 STAT. 153 (1924), 8 U. S. C. § 224(m) (1940),
Silva v. Tillinghast, 36 F. (2d) 801 (D. Mass. 1929). A transoceanic telephone marriage has
been used to evade the statute. See N. Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1933, § 2, p. 5, col. 2.
101. RiCEEMOND AND HALL, MARRIAGE AND TE STATE (1929) 194 cl sc2.
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A practical problem posed by extra-territorial recourse to' the absentee
marriage is that the validity of such marriage may be determined in a juris-
diction other than that of celebration befoie the courts of the celebrating
jurisdiction have passed on the question. This raises the issue of the weight
which must be accorded the lex loci contraclu in the forum state. The courts
have thus far shown a tendency toward stringency in requiring proof that
the law of the place of celebration permits absentee marriage,0 2 but, at least
in jurisdictions friendly to the common law marriage, have tended toward
lenience where a common law marriage in another jurisdiction is alleged.103
ABSENTEE MARRIAGE AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
Prior to the expansion of governmental social services, couples were seldom
required to prove the validity of their marriage, and litigation of the validity
of a marriage irregularly formed was infrequent.' Workmen's Compensa-
tion and Social Security acts, attaching money value to the status of widow
in social strata where inhetitance was formerly of insufficient magnitude to
justify litigation,' and the servicemen's dependent's support laws of the
two World Wars,106 requiring proof of marriage by every serviceman claim-
ing family allowance, have given rise to more common law marriage adjudi-
cations than formerly appeared in all the recorded cases. 17 Thus far, war-
time absentee marriage has not caused significant judicial litigation10 8
But during the war the administrative load involving such marriage has
been, perhaps, at its peak. Every serviceman's absentee marriage required
an attempt by some administrative official to predict judicial reaction in the
jurisdiction of celebration, in order to determine existence of a "lawful wife"
for payment of family allowance, pension, or insurance benefits,' under
liability of personal restitution of funds wrongfully paid out."' Because of
102. See Cosulich Societa Triestina di Navigazione v. Elting, 66 F. (2d) 534, 536 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1933) (Italy); Hawaii v. Li Shee, 12 Hawaii 329, 330 (1900) (China). But see Great
Northern Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 254 Fed. 683, 685 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918) (Missouri).
103. See Hutchins v. Kimmell, 31 Mich. 126, 132 (1875); Dumaresly v. Fishly, 10 Ky.
368, 369 (1821). See also Meister v. Moore, 96 U. S. 76, 81 (1877).
104. See Billig and Lynch, Common-Law Marriage in Minnesota: a Problem in Social Se.
curity (1938) 22 MINN. L. Rtv. 177, 179 n. 4.
105. See Lynch, Social Security Encounters Common-Law Marriage in North Carolina
(1938) 16 N. C. L. REv. 255. And see Report of Special Committee on Workmen's Compensa.
tlion (1934) 6 PA. B. A. Q. 93,98.
106. Compare 40 STAT. 400 (1917) with 56 STAT. 384, 385 (1942), 37 U. S. C. §§ 212,
220 (Cum. Supp. 1945).
107. See KOEGEL, ComolON LAW MARRIAGE (1922) 101; Note (1941) 15 Tinu'. L. Q.
541, 542 n. 17.
108. The only known cases thus far have been on the trial court level. See cases cited
supra notes 22 and 98.
109. See Ashby, Proxy Nuptials Plague V. A., United Press feature, Louistille Courier-
Journal, Apr. 16, 1946, p. 11, col. 1.
110. On the origins of personal liability, see MANSFIELD, TnE COMPTROLLER GENERAL
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this last factor, the wartime administrative opinions perhaps represent a
more cautious than accurate portrayal of the law in the State concerned.
The Comptioller General,"1 in passing on vouchers submitted for officer's
dependency allowance 11 in absentee marriage cases, has followed the prin-
ciple that
"generally, in the absence of a statute or decision of a proper
court to the effect that such marriages are recognized or authorized
in a particular jurisdiction, such marriages will not be recognized
. . . as establishing an officer's right to increased allow,-ances on ac-
count of a 'lawful wife'." "'
The Office of Dependency Benefits originally enunciated a less conserva-
tive policy, authorizing family allotments based on absentee marriage of
enlisted men "if in the opinion of the Attorney General of the state of cele-
bration, such a marriage is valid," 114 but, in practice, was inclined to follow
the lead of the Comptroller General.'
The Veterans Administration, in absentee marriage claims for National
Service Life Insurance payments, has withheld decision
"pending action by the courts of the particular jurisdiction ...
However, where the question arises in those states which recognize
common law marriage and the facts are such as to meet the require-
ments of a valid common law marriage, the same are recognized by
the Veteran's Administration as valid common law marriages, even
though the courts of that jurisdiction have not as yet passed on the
validity of proxy marriages." 110
The Judge Advocate General of the Army has "consistently refrained from
expressing an official opinion" "I on absentee marriage, but has from time to
(1939) 123-7. Liability under the Servicemen's Dependents Support Act of 1942 arises
only on gross negligence or fraudulent intent. 56 STAT. 384 (1942), 37 U. S. C. § 212 (Cum.
Supp. 1945).
111. In practice, the Comptroller General frequently gives advance opinions on the
allowability of payments. See MANSFIELD, THE COu!PTROLLER GENEizx (1939) 101.
112. See 56 STAT. 361 (1942) 37 U. S. C. §§ 104, 106 (Cum. Supp. 1945).
113. Decision B-46242, Feb. 7, 1945, p. 6 (marriage by proxy in the District of Colum-
bia). The principle was cited and followed in subsequent opinions. B-51263, Nov. 2, 1945
(Mexico); B-53572, Nov. 21, 1945 (New Mexico); B-52448, Nov. 26, 1945 (Kansas);
B-49442, June 13, 1945 (Oklahoma); B-48905, May 16, 1945 (Florida).
114. OFFICE oF DEPFNDENCY BENEFITS, SEnavIc.mN's DEPENDENTS ALLOWAICE AcE
oF 1942 ANN. (1944) 44-5, quoted, Communication to YALE LAW JoutnI. from Lt. Col.
Isidore Hornstein, Legal Branch, 0. D. B., Jan. 24, 1946.
115. Communication cited supra note 114. Payments under the Act are not, however,
subject to review by the Comptroller General. 56 STAT. 384 (1942), 37 U. S. C. § 212 (Cum.
Supp. 1945).
116. Communication to YALE LAW JouRNAL from Edward E. Odom, Solicitor, Veteran
Administration, Feb. 5, 1946.
117. Communication to YALE L..w JouRNAL from Lt. Col. Milton J. Blake, Legal
Assistance Branch, Judge Adv. Gen., A. U. S., Jan. 31, 1946.
19461
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
time prepared memoranda for Legal Assistance Officers on the subject.11 8
The guiding policy has been
"that servicemen generally will be advised not to undertake such
marriage unless there are special compelling circumstances which
can only be solved by immediate marriage, and then only when they
have been advised of the doubtful legal effect of such action and are
willing to take such risk." 119
The Federal Security Agency, pursuant to Section 209(m) of the Social
Security Act,' has followed state law and, accordingly, has generally looked
to the law of the place of celebration to determine the validity of absentee
-marriage for social security purposes.1
The principles adopted by administrative agencies leave much to be
desired from the standpoint of the couple married in absentia. Extraneous
considerations, such as the attitude of a particular attorney general or the
fear of a given administrator of personal liability, affect the determination of
the law. A marriage may be pronounced valid for the purposes of the one
agency and invalid for the purposes of another.12 2 It seems probable that in
the near future this resultant conflict must be determined by the courts or by
the legislatures. In addition to 'the normal litigational sources, 123 the ad-
118. See J. A. G. Legal Assistance Memoranda: No. 10, Jan. 17, 1944, 2; No. 17,
July 14, 1944, 3; No. 18, Aug. 10, 1944, 2; No. 23, Jan. 31, 1945, 5; No. 25, Apr. 20,
1945, 3 and app.; No. 27, June 11, 1945, 5; No. 28, July 16, 1945, 5; No. 29, Aug. 1,
1945, 4; No. 33, Nov. 19, 1945, 1 4 and app.; No. 34, Dec. 29, 1945, 4.
119. J. A.G. Legal Assistance Memorandum No. 10, Jan. 17, 1944 2(b).
120. 49 STAT. 625 (1935), 42 U. S. C. § 409(m) (1940).
121. Sustained: marriages by proxy celebrated in Japan and Dalmatia. Rejected:
marriages by proxy celebrated in Pago-Pago, Hawaii, and Washington. Communication to
YALE LAW JOURNAL from Earle V. Simrell, Ass't Gen. Counsel, Fed. Security Agency,
Feb. 18, 1946.
122. The Comptroller General does not undertake to pass on the validity of absentee
marriage other than for purposes of allowances. Communication to YALE LAW JOURNAL
from Frank L. Yates, Ass't Comp. Gen., Feb. 12, 1946. Cf. Silva v. Tillinghast, 36 F. (2d)
801 (D. Mass. 1929) (Portuguese proxy marriage valid, but under Federal statute, supra
note 100, does not establish marital status for immigration purposes), and REp. ATr'y GEN.
OF N. Y. (1934) 371 (marriage by mail may be valid, but will not be recorded by Dep't of
Health). This practice is analogous to the English common law attachment of different legal
consequences to marriages differently formed. See Roberts v. Roberts, 58 Wyo. 438, at 450,
133 P. (2d) 492, at 495 (1943).
123. Common law marriage has arisen almost entirely as a collateral issue, most fre-
quently in inheritance [see, e.g., Fryer v. Fryer, Rich. Eq. Cas. 85 (S. C. Ct. of App. 1832);
Lefkoff v. Sicro, 189 Ga. 554, 6 S. E. (2d) 687 (1939)] and domestic relations cases (see, e.g.,
Beverlin v. Beverlin, 29 W. Va. 732, 3 S. E. 36 (1887) (divorce); Riddle v. Riddle, 26 Utah
268, 72 Pac. 1081 (1903) (separate maintenance)]. And see State v. Worthingham, 23 Minn.
528 (1877) (bastardy); Hantz v. Sealy, 6 Binney 405 (Pa. 1814) (assumpsit); Dumaresly v
Fishly, 10 Ky. 368 (1821) (slander); Morrill v. Palmer, 68 Vt. 1, 33 Atl. 829 (1895) (deceit);
Graham v. Bennett, 2 Cal. 503 (1852) (abduction); Milford v. Worcester, 7 Mass. 48 (1810)
(pauper's support); The Lauderdale Peerage, 10 App. Cas. 692 (H. of L., Comm. on Privi-
leges, 1885) (peerage); State v. Wilson, 121 N. C. 650, 28 S. E. 416 (1897) (seduction);
Goodrich v. Cushman, 34 Nebr. 460, 51 N. W. 1041 (1892) (clear title); in re Walsh, 54 F.
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ministrative rulings may force the issue. 124
CONCLUSION
The leading rationale on which decisions as to the validity of absentee
marriage are predicated will vary in application because of intricacies of
local law and the facts of specific cases. However, in passing on the validity
of absentee marriage, the courts may well consider that the issues decided
transcend the controversy immediately before them.
In those jurisdictions where court or legislature has previously foreclosed
any form of marriage not in strict compliance with statute, absentee mar-
riage merits legislative consideration. When a state assumes the authority to
prescribe the sole conditions under which its citizens may assume so basic a
relation as that of marriage, it incurs the responsibility of making certain,
in so far as possible, that the privilege of marrying is denied only by design,
and not by inadvertence.
In jurisdictions where the courts approve absentee marriage, the legisla-
ture may well consider possible limitations on such privilege. The utility of
absentee marriage in wartime does not necessarily justify its existence in
peacetime, when it may be used as another channel for evasion of police re-
strictions. 25 In jurisdictions where absentee marriage has been performed
during the war, it may also be advisable for legislatures to consider curative
statutes, 1' expressly validating absentee marriages previously performed.
The serviceman who has deemed it advisable to resort to absentee mar-
riage while detained by his country overseas deserves to have his plight con-
sidered,-whether in legislature, courtroom or administrative office,-in the
light of sound considerations of basic policy rather than naked legalism or
inertiatic adherence to convention.
Supp. 769 (E. D. Pa. 1944) (naturalization); Dawson v. U. S., 10 F. (2d) 106 (C. C. A. 9th,
1926) cerl. denied 271 U. S. 687 (1926) (Mann Act conspiracy); Carmichael v. State, 12 Ohio
St. 553 (1861) (bigamy).
124. An immediate objective in the Hardy case, supra note 22, vas cancellation of family
allovrance procured by the "wife." Communication to YALE LAW Joum.AL from S. Ralph
Stone, Independence, Mo. attorney, Mar. 19, 1946. Judicial review of the Comptroller
General's decisions is possible by (1) suit by the government to recover disalloved payment
from disbursing officer or surety, (2) suit in the Court of Claims by (a) the claimant or (b)
the disbursing officer after refunding disalloved payment, or (3) suit for mandamus or
mandatory injunction to comepl payment. MA.:sFELD, THE CourrOLLER GEEMRAL (1939)
106-7. The Veteran's Administration is authorized to interplead claimants under a given
National Service Life Insurance policy in the appropriate Federal court. 43 STAT. 612
(1924), 38 U.S. C. § 445 (1940). Declaratory judgment [see Hardin v. Davis, 30 Ohio 0. 524,
(C. P. Hamilton County 1945)] and mandamus to compel registration of an abzentwe mar-
riage [see State ex rel. Felson v. Allen, 129 Conn. 427, 29 A. (2d) 306 (1942)] are convenient
direct avenues for securing a state court adjudication without awaiting the fortuity of death,
crime, or marital discord.
125. See note 101 supra.
126. See 1 VERNmER, AmERIC.! FAimy L,!Ws (1931) § 20. And see Note, L. R. A.
1915E, 8, 21-2 (Texas bond marriages and curative statutes).
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